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“Violence and Press Incendiarism”:  
Media and Labor Conflicts in the 1909 Strike1
“I punished Sheba because he is a traitor to the Japanese people . . .  
I’m glad I did it and I am only sorry I didn’t do a better job of it.  
I have punished Sheba and now I’m ready to pay for it.” 2
On a bright August morning in 1910, a young man named Tomo-
kichi Mori stood waiting outside the U.S. District Court House 
in downtown Honolulu, with a pocketknife in hand that he had 
sharpened to a “razor-like edge.”3 Mori had traveled to Honolulu 
from Maui, where he served as an interpreter for the Circuit Court 
in Wai luku. But his presence on the corner of King and Smith Streets 
had nothing to do with business. He was there for a more personal 
and ultimately more nefarious matter. As Mori patiently bided his 
time, a middle-aged Japanese man emerged from the attorney gen-
eral’s office. Mori immediately recognized him as Sometaro Shiba, 
the editor of the Hawaii Shinpo, one of the major Japanese-language 
news papers in Hawai‘i.4 Seeing his target, Mori quickly approached 
Shiba and accused him of being a “traitor” to his people, a charge 
that stemmed from Shiba’s close relationship with the powerful sugar 
planters who dominated the political, social, and economic land-
scape of the Islands. Mori also criticized Shiba for selling out the 
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Japa nese community in Hawai‘i, as Shiba had publicly condemned 
the thousands of Japanese workers across the various plantations on 
O‘ahu who had walked off their jobs to protest their low pay in what 
became the largest island-wide strike.5 As Shiba turned away from 
Mori in an attempt to avoid a verbal confrontation, Mori lunged at 
Shiba’s throat with his blade, barely missing Shiba’s jugular vein and 
carotid artery but opening a gash a half-inch deep. When Mori swung 
again, the blade grazed Shiba’s scalp and left a wound an inch and 
a half in length before the tip of the blade broke. Before shocked 
onlookers could intervene, Mori inflicted two more cuts on Shiba’s 
left arm, at which point Shiba finally succeeded in wrestling Mori 
to the ground. As Mori’s later court testimony revealed, he felt no 
remorse for attacking Shiba due to Shiba’s “traitorous” activities 
in the course of the 1909 strike, a strike that divided the Japanese 
community over the question of higher wages for Japanese laborers 
on the sugar plantations. While this bloody altercation was clearly 
a personal attack against Shiba by Mori, it ultimately involved the 
newspapermen of the ethnic and white presses, the leading attorneys 
of the territory, the planters, the Japanese consulate and territorial 
officials, and the workers themselves. The 1909 strike was notable not 
just as the largest strike in Hawai‘i to date, but also as a flashpoint for 
raising issues that polarized the Japanese and white communities. It 
resulted in heated clashes in the newspapers, courtrooms, and on the 
streets that culminated in outbreaks of violence, such as Mori’s vicious 
attack on Shiba. It would establish critical precedents in the ways 
authorities responded to the 1920 strike and later the internment of 
Japanese leaders in the Islands during World War II by targeting select 
indi viduals to break the leadership of the Japanese community. 
Hawai‘i’s Early Strike History
Racial tensions between Japanese laborers on the plantations and 
the white plantation owners had slowly grown since the arrival of the 
first large group of Japanese immigrants over a quarter of a century 
earlier. Lynching victim Katsu Gotō was one of these Gannenmono or 
“first-year men” who migrated to the Islands in 1868 in response to 
the growing labor needs, and his death was reflective of the tensions 
that existed on the plantations.6 His lynching was designed to weaken 
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Japanese resistance through the highly visualized brutalization of a 
Japanese male, a man who had challenged white plantation control 
by supporting workers’ efforts against an exploitative capitalist sys-
tem on the plantations. Following the United States’ annexation of 
Hawai‘i, workers’ failure to abide by the terms of a labor contract was 
no longer a criminal offense—workers could no longer be arrested 
for protesting against harsh labor conditions or terms—and this shift 
unleashed an “epidemic” of labor conflicts.7 In 1900 alone, thirty-
one labor strikes occurred on the various plantations in the Hawaiian 
Islands.8 However, these strikes were generally confined to a limited 
locality, often lasted just a few days, and received little attention in the 
press.9 Yet, in 1907, the governments of Japan and America enacted 
a treaty called the Gentleman’s Agreement Act, which prohibited the 
migration of workers from Hawai‘i to the mainland United States. 
This single piece of legislation dramatically affected the fortunes of 
laborers, who could no longer escape to better working conditions or 
higher pay and instead were forced to confront plantation managers 
with their complaints, which soon escalated into major strike move-
ments. 
In 1909, Japanese workers initiated a strike on the island of O‘ahu 
which “in every respect . . . was the most important labor conflict that 
had ever occurred in Hawaii up to that date.”10 It marked a fundamen-
tal shift from previous labor movements in its character and impact, 
as it extended far beyond the plantations to involve the planter elite, 
high-ranking government authorities, and influential leaders within 
the Japanese community. Unlike previous strikes, this particular work 
stoppage was the result of nearly eight months of deliberations, meet-
ings, and discussions by Japanese plantation workers on the issue of 
their salaries and their need to increase them. It was also remarkable 
for its scope and scale, as it became an island-wide strike involving 
Japanese laborers from the various plantations on O‘ahu. This strike 
not only resulted in nearly $2,000,000 in losses for plantation owners, 
but also led to the arrest of prominent Japanese newspaper editors, 
reporters, and lawyers who officials charged with conspiracy to initiate 
violence on behalf of their cause; they were held responsible for the 
various riots and disturbances that occurred and for the attempted 
murder of Shiba.11 Ultimately, the planters broke the strike but made 
a number of concessions to laborers, including higher wages, bet-
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ter housing facilities, and improved sanitation conditions. However, 
it was the leaders of the strike who bore the brunt of the planters’ 
wrath. They were tried and found guilty of conspiracy, sentenced to 
ten months in O‘ahu Prison, and fined $300 in a legal system that 
served planter interests. 
Origins of the Strike and the Significance of 
“Unintelligible Ideographs” in the  
Japanese-Language Press12
Although the 1909 strike officially began in May of that year and con-
tinued throughout the latter part of the following summer, the strike 
itself originated in a series of newspaper articles published nearly a 
year earlier. These articles publicized the demeaning and dehuman-
izing conditions endured by the Japanese laborers, who worked on 
the plantations for minimal pay with little recourse, as they were sub-
jected to the restrictive terms of the 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement 
Act, a topic of heated criticism in the Japanese-language newspapers. 
At the turn of the century, Hawai‘i supported a foreign-language 
press unparalleled in size and diversity among agricultural commu-
nities based upon immigrant labor. The Japanese community alone 
published eleven Japanese-language newspapers, which possessed 
diverse viewpoints and a wide distribution across the Islands.13 While 
there are few records about the numbers of copies printed, newspa-
per scholar Helen Geracimos Chapin argues for a large readership 
as “the papers were passed from reader to reader, plantation camp 
to plantation camp, and island to island.”14 ‘Aiea plantation strike 
leader Seisaku Kawahara, who was active in the 1909 strike, recalled 
that laborers “used to gather around . . . [and] pool their resources” 
to purchase the Nippu Jiji as most laborers could not afford the daily 
fifty-nine cents cost of the newspaper.15 At one sitting, nearly thirty 
people would “get together and read these things that the paper had 
put out” for the benefit of the “illiterates” in the group.16 Published as 
dailies, weeklies, biweeklies, and monthlies in Japanese or in Japanese 
and English, these papers were purchased by immigrants who had a 
nearly seventy percent literacy rate and who read not just Japanese 
but also rudimentary Hawaiian and English. Chapin argues that most 
Japanese did not read dominant white-owned newspapers, such as the 
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Pacific Commercial Advertiser and the Evening Bulletin, but instead pre-
ferred to read publications from the Japanese-language press. These 
papers not only informed readers of significant local and international 
events, but also played an important role in maintaining cultural ties 
to Japan while acculturating immigrants to new social practices and 
customs.17 However, the Japanese-language press was by no means 
uniform in its editorial views, as the newspapers divided “according 
to class and political interests: from politically conservative and coun-
seling caution to moderate and fence straddling, to the more radical 
that seek improved conditions for its people in the new land.”18 To 
the white establishment, however, the Japanese press was a specter 
threatening its political and economic control over the Islands. In 
his comprehensive study of Japanese newspapers in Hawai‘i, scholar 
Shunzō Sakamaki observed that dominant whites suspected “all those 
unintelligible ideographs of the Japanese language papers” of pro-
moting “anti-Americanism” among Hawai‘i’s large Japanese popula-
tion. They considered them “hiding places for a sinister move to oust 
American control from these islands.”19
To many, these fears became realized when the ethnic newspapers 
began publicizing the harsh working and substandard living condi-
tions endured by Japanese laborers for low pay. On 25 August 1908, 
the Japanese-language daily Hawaii Nichi Nichi Shinbun, edited by 
Hanzo Tsurushima, printed an article by Gunkichi Shimada, who had 
traveled to all the islands of Hawai‘i to gather material for a book. 
From his research and observations, Shimada pointed out that “prices 
had recently increased more than 20 percent, but that the wage of 
the Japanese laborer, if he worked 26 days a month, did not exceed 
$18.00, and this made it difficult for him to gain a livelihood.”20 This 
article attracted the attention of a young man, Motoyuki Negoro, 
a recent graduate of a California law school, who had returned to 
Hawai‘i only to discover that, as an alien, he was unable to practice 
law. After reading Shimada’s article, Negoro wrote a long treatise enti-
tled “How About The Higher Wages,” which began by stating that “we 
regret that wages in Hawaii are disproportionately low in comparison 
with the large profits.”21 Negoro argued that the Japanese government 
should intercede for Japanese laborers, “for the Japanese government 
is well aware that its subjects are not born to be slaves of the capital-
ists of Hawaii.” Negoro first took his article to Shiba, of the Hawaii 
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Shinpo, who rejected the material as unsuitable and unpublishable. 
Subsequently, Negoro brought his work to Yasutaro Soga, publisher 
and editor of the Nippu Jiji. As Soga recalled, “I read it and found 
the argument splendid and just. I willingly consented to publish it.” 
Thereafter, the piece began to run serially in the Nippu Jiji, its posi-
tions fully supported by the paper.
The first call to action therefore came from the newspaper Nippu 
Jiji, which printed Negoro’s article, entitled “The Higher Wages Ques-
tion,” on 31 July 1908. Soga had already been instrumental in lead-
ing opposition to the emigration company banks and their exploita-
tion of the workers’ deposits, and now he joined in the fight to raise 
wages by printing Negoro’s work. Emphasizing that “the time is ripe,” 
Negoro called for laborers to “recover the lost liberty of choosing and 
changing their place of abode and become a full-fledged man and 
to be in a position to earn a just reward for their labor.”22 Negoro 
criticized the prohibition against Japanese migration to America and 
pointed out that the taxes levied on the worker and the rapidly esca-
lating price of goods had further reduced the income of the Japanese 
plantation workers, already the lowest paid in the industry, to little 
more than $18 per month.23 The article sparked considerable discus-
sion and debate among the urban residents of Honolulu, particularly 
among the leaders of the Japanese-language press, who then divided 
on the issue of higher wages for Japanese plantation laborers. 
The Nippu Jiji, with a circulation of 1,000, along with the Maui 
Shim bun (Wailuku, Maui), the Shokumin Shinbun (Hilo, Hawai‘i), the 
Kona Echo (Hōlualoa, Hawai‘i), and the Oahu Jiho (Waipahu, O‘ahu), 
advocated for higher wages. They were considered “radicals” for their 
support of decisive and immediate action and for maintaining that 
the grievances of the Japanese plantation laborers—which included 
low wages, poor housing, unsanitary conditions, and other discrim-
inatory treatment—could only be remedied by means of collective 
bargaining.24 In contrast, the “conservatives,” which included the 
Hawaii Shinpo (Honolulu, Hawai‘i), Hawaiian-Japanese Daily Chronicle 
(Honolulu, Hawai‘i), Kauai Shinpo (Līhu‘e, Kaua‘i), Hilo Shinpo (Hilo, 
Hawai‘i), Kainan Shinpo (Hilo, Hawai‘i), and Maui Hochi (Waihiken, 
Maui), supported a more judicious and cautious approach when deal-
ing with the planters because they pointed out that “Japanese labor-
ers are no longer allowed to migrate to Hawaii” with the enactment 
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of the Gentleman’s Agreement Act.25 In light of this labor shortage, 
“reckless action on the part of the Japanese residents in Hawaii might 
possibly lead to a situation where the planters will turn to European 
laborers to replace the Japanese working on the plantations.”26 They 
believed that differences between the laborers and the planters should 
be settled without striking, and they supported industrial conciliation 
rather than collective action or public demonstration. 
The higher wages article was the first in a series of reports that 
appeared in the Nippu Jiji, and the issue of better pay for Japanese 
workers soon turned into an extremely controversial subject that pro-
voked “bitter verbal warfare” between two contending parties—the 
Nippu Jiji and its associates on one hand, and the Hawaii Shinpo and 
its allies on the other. The Nippu Jiji regarded the Hawaii Shinpo and 
its conservative colleagues as traitors to the Japanese of Hawai‘i, while 
the coalition led by the Hawaii Shinpo labeled the Nippu Jiji and its 
associates agitators and peace disturbers. In light of these divisions 
within the Japanese community, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser (later 
The Higher Wage Association, Honolulu, Hawai‘i. From left: front, Matsutari Yamashiro, 
Yasutaro Soga, Kinzaburo Makino, Motoyuki Negoro, Yokiichi Tasaka; back, Yasuyuki 
Imai, Tsurumatsu Okumura, Katsuichi Kawamoto, Hidekichi Takemura, Keitaro Kawa-
mura, Shuichi Ihara. 1909. Bishop Museum. 
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the Honolulu Advertiser) and the Evening Bulletin (later the Honolulu-
Star Bulletin), which represented planter interests, subsequently dis-
missed the demand for higher wages and the threat of an impending 
strike as “a species of mild pleasantry” and a “wild bluff.”27
The consensus among most Japanese workers, however, was that a 
wage increase was imperative. Despite efforts by community members 
to bring together the two opposing newspapers, the Nippu Jiji and 
Hawaii Shinpo remained on opposing sides of the labor controversy, 
with their editors, Soga and Shiba, heading the separate factions. 
In December 1908, at the Japanese YMCA building in Honolulu, a 
group of leading Japanese officials formed an organization called 
Zōkyū Kisei Kai, or the Higher Wage Association, with its unofficial 
head quarters located at the Yamashiro Hotel on Beretania Street, 
across from A‘ala Park.28 Participants in the meeting elected Kinza-
buro “Fred” Makino, Motoyuki Negoro, and Matsutaro Yamashiro 
chairman, secretary, and treasurer, respectively. As one of their first 
courses of action, these leaders of the Higher Wage Association cre-
ated a formal list of demands accompanied by impressive documen-
Motoyuki Negoro, secretary of the Higher Wage Association, speaking to the strikers in 
‘Aiea, O‘ahu, Hawai‘i. 1909. Bishop Museum.
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tation and an explanation of their position. Arguing that “the Japa-
nese here are not coolies,” they claimed that workers “are entitled to 
demand equal wages as the labor of other nationalities.”29 In light of 
the twenty-five percent increase in the cost of basic necessities, they 
maintained that the demand for a wage of $22.50 or more was neither 
extravagant nor “unreasonable.”30 Calling for an end to all racial pay 
gradations—Filipino cane cutters, for example, were paid only $.69 in 
average wages per day in 1910, as compared to $.99 for Japanese cane 
cutters; English blacksmiths earned $3.79 in average wages per day, 
while Japanese blacksmiths made only $1.48—and the establishment 
of standard pay scales for each job, the association also demanded 
improvements to churches, schools, and basic housing, which were all 
“utterly unfit for married men, or for bringing up their children, both 
for the sanitary and moral points of view.”31 Nippu Jiji editor Soga, a 
member of the Higher Wage Association, described the dwellings of 
the laborers as “filthy” and “unsanitary,” noting that it would be more 
proper to describe them as “pig sties” than as houses. To give one 
example, he cited the Wai‘anae plantation for having “baths in the 
open” and “the unseemly sight of men going to them stark naked and 
the women clad only in loin cloths.”32 Soga detailed how many camps 
often lacked basic sewage and waste facilities, resulting in “a certain 
unbearably foul smell” that hung in the air “on all the sugar planta-
tions throughout the islands.”33 Soga was outraged at the conditions 
endured by Japanese laborers, and he used the Nippu Jiji to publicize 
the plight of workers and to garner support for the cause. 
A description of the poor physical conditions of the camps was 
included in a formal report by the Higher Wages Association that 
requested planters to give high priority to improvements. The orga-
nization presented the letter and voluminous supporting documents 
to the directors of the Hawaii Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA) in 
January 1909, and the workers waited for a response. The directors 
did not acknowledge the letter or accompanying papers, as they had 
adopted a policy of complete silence, refusing to recognize in any way 
the existence of the Higher Wage Association. After waiting patiently 
for nearly five months without receiving any reply, workers began to 
walk off their jobs during the month of May, beginning at the ‘Aiea 
plantation and spreading to the more remote plantations on O‘ahu. 
By the end of the month, some seven thousand workers were on strike. 
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The 1909 Strike
Confronted for the first time with the prospect of an island-wide labor 
movement, the planters now faced the possibility of incurring seri-
ous economic losses given the scope of the strike and the difficulty 
of replacing so many strikers with strikebreakers. On 10 May 1909, 
the trustees of the HSPA moved to meet this threat by adopting a 
loss-sharing agreement to spread the financial losses from the strike 
to all the member plantations. As labor historian Edward Beechert 
explained, “The losses of the struck plantations were to be met by an 
assessment of the production of each member plantation and paid to 
those showing losses.”34 This strategy showcased the shared interests 
of all the plantations in crushing this particular strike and in end-
ing any future labor movements that threatened the hegemony of 
the planters. That this strike involved Japanese workers particularly 
alarmed the planters since at the time the Japanese constituted nearly 
forty-two percent of the total population in Hawai‘i and comprised a 
significant portion of the labor force on the plantations.35 
On 22 May, the HSPA announced that it would not discuss wages 
or working conditions with any organization until all work resumed. 
Workers who did not return immediately would be discharged and 
evicted from the plantation camps. When striking laborers ignored 
this declaration, the planters began to institute mass evictions, first 
at ‘Aiea and then at Waipahu. Lacking living quarters, workers began 
erecting a number of makeshift camps in and around Honolulu and 
Waipahu. Evicted families, particularly those with children, were par-
tially assisted with monies from a small strike fund that the Higher 
Wage Association had established for such purposes, eventually total-
ing nearly $42,000.36 By 24 May, the Higher Wage Association was 
supporting about 3,500 strikers.37 Many of the striking laborers had 
lived in plantation housing and, despite substandard housing facili-
ties, remained at the mercy of the planters given that their low wages 
barely exceeded household expenditures. Many Japanese families 
earned just enough to support their families and were always at the 
threshold of poverty and debt.
As soon as the strikers poured into Honolulu from the various plan-
tations, Consul General Senichi Uyeno issued an official notice on 25 
May, expressing his regret that the laborers had gone on strike and 
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urging them to return peacefully to work. He repeated his statement 
three weeks later at a gathering at the Honolulu Theater, where he 
encouraged attending laborers to go back to the plantations.38 Uyeno 
believed that a peaceful and conciliatory course of action would be 
more effective in settling the higher-wage issue. He further stressed 
to the laborers the absolute necessity of conducting nonviolent and 
orderly protests as violence and labor agitation would disturb the 
peace and order of the community and threaten the economic life 
of the Japanese in Hawai‘i. This proclamation was, in the words of 
one scholar, of “no avail,” as striking workers continued to gather in 
Honolulu and as the HSPA passed a resolution just two days later on 
27 May, affirming that the association would not grant the requests of 
strikers for the duration of the strike.39
In response to Uyeno’s statements, the leaders of the strike accused 
him of intervening “for the benefit of the Hawaiian planters” and 
blindly following the advice of the “planters’ dogs” while ignoring the 
“good reputation” and the “benefit of the Japanese.”40 The officers of 
the Higher Wage Association soundly denounced Uyeno as an “office 
man” and “incompetent,” while his statements were widely publi-
cized in both the English- and Japanese-language presses and used to 
encourage the return of workers to the plantations.41 
Although many scholars have considered the role of the consul 
in the strike as peripheral or inconsequential, it is clear that Uyeno 
actively supported the control of Japanese labor, closely monitored 
the situation, and strongly desired the return of the laborers to the 
plan tations.42 Uyeno hardly acted as an impartial observer to the 
strike, and he represented yet another obstacle to the strike move-
ment and the recognition of workers’ demands. Despite Negoro’s 
original appeal to the Japanese government, the consulate did not 
support collective labor movements. Even prior to the strike, Uyeno 
had become subject to public slander as a result of his role in estab-
lishing controls over workers.43 In 1903, the consul was the president 
of the Central Japanese League, an organization established to “pre-
vent the emigration of the Japanese to the States” and committed to 
“temper their aggressiveness.”44 The purpose of the League was to “act 
as a conciliation board in all matters of dispute between laborers and 
their employers,” and it “absolutely opposed” strikes as “the doings of 
unruly children or like the act of barbarians, rather than of civilized 
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men.”45 Although the passage of the 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement 
Act successfully accomplished one of the goals of the League, the con-
sul evidently still remained active in suppressing strikes and “all other 
violent acts” six years later, when Japanese workers ranked among the 
lowest paid laborers on the plantations.46 
Throughout the strike, the planters benefited from the support 
of the Japanese consulate and its solidarity against laborers. They 
remained in close communication with one another and presented a 
united front. In contrast, the Japanese community was rife with divi-
sions as neither the workers nor the leaders had any experience in 
organizing a strike.47 The strike effort was also weakened by a lack of 
wider community support, since it involved only Japanese laborers. As 
noted in 1910 by the commissioner of labor, “a strike conducted on 
exclusively national lines can hardly succeed in Hawaii,” as employ-
ers are “too well organized, disciplined, and financed.”48 According 
to Beechert, “no appeals, other than one for general support, were 
made to other groups of workers.”49 That most of the petitions were 
printed in the Japanese language and were couched in traditional Jap-
anese terms, appealing to the spirit of Japanese nationalism, ensured 
that they would be read only by a small number of individuals and 
garner a limited amount of support from other groups. In fact, the 
homogenous ethnic character of the strike was used against the work-
ers as the HSPA hired Chinese, Hawaiian, Portuguese, and Korean 
strikebreakers at a rate of $1.50 a day to undermine the efforts and 
the morale of the Japanese strikers. The use of ethnic workers, par-
ticularly those antagonistic to the Japanese, became a fairly common 
practice as planters hired strikebreakers in Honolulu and transported 
them to Waipahu and ‘Aiea on special trains that were draped with 
banners proclaiming the end of the strike. Although there was never 
a large pool of unemployed sugar workers that could be summoned 
for short periods of time during the strike, this was an important tactic 
in weakening Japanese morale.
Imprisonment of the Leaders and the Ensuing “Press War”50
Planters employed another important strategy, the legal harassment 
of the strike leaders and their supporters. Government officials and 
plantation owners were a close-knit and well-connected group, due to 
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shared economic and political interests. The same powerful relation-
ships extended into the courtroom, providing more evidence of the 
dual system of justice in Hawai‘i, which was exercised with varying 
degrees of success to control the Japanese and other minorities. The 
law served as a tool for the plantation owners in their attempts to 
establish economic and legal control over the lives of the immigrant 
workers. According to Beechert, persecution under the law became a 
common course of action for employers in future strikes until labor 
finally won recognition after World War II.51
Throughout the strike, the Higher Wage Association urged 
restraint against radical action, reminding workers to “do no act of 
 violence. This is a model strike. Be united.”52 Various warnings ran 
in the Nippu Jiji, and Makino and Negoro made personal appeals to 
laborers against the use of force, threatening violators with exclusion 
from the movement.53 Although individual workers did engage in 
incidences of violence, the leaders of the Higher Wage Association 
immediately condemned these actions; the English-language presses 
nonetheless linked the strike movement and any violence to the incen-
diary articles written in the Japanese newspapers. On 26 May 1909, 
the Pacific Commercial Advertiser reported that a non-striking Japanese 
laborer named Tsuchiya Giichi from the ‘Ewa plantation near Honou-
liuli was “badly handed by four thugs, who broke his arm, made ugly 
bruises on his back and just over his kidneys, damaged his face and 
lamed his legs.”54 As a result of the attack on this “loyal laborer,” who 
was hospitalized with severe injuries, officials arrested and detained 
twenty-one Japanese strikers without warrants.55
Immediately after the incident, Makino issued an open letter to 
Sheriff William P. Jarrett that was publicized in the newspapers. He 
expressed his “extreme regret” for Giichi’s assault. He assured the 
sheriff “that the Higher Wage Association is in no way responsible 
for the fight” and that it “from the beginning of the strike has always 
urged the Japanese to avoid any breech [sic] of the peace.”56 On the 
same day, Walter G. Smith, editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 
wrote an editorial titled “Violence and Press Incendiarism,” which 
derided Makino’s professions of innocence. Smith claimed that “it is 
useless for the leaders of the Higher Wage Association to try and clear 
themselves of moral responsibility for the assault on the strikebreaker 
Giichi.”57 Smith conceded, “They may not have sent or even known 
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the criminals who tried to do the man to death”; moreover, Smith 
acknowledged “that they knew nothing in advance of the plan to maim 
or slay the victim.” However, Smith asserted, “they have supported and 
still support a policy which their newspaper organ expresses for them, 
of malevolent hatred toward the laborers who have not struck or who 
prefer work to agitation.” According to Smith, “the epithets ‘dog’ 
and ‘pig’ applied to conservative Japanese,” as well as appeals to the 
“sword” and the “hammer,” combined with “half-veiled threats against 
the lives of opponents” and “the quoting of vernacular poetry which 
suggest bloodshed as a means of carrying one’s point,” have stirred 
“homicidal blood among the more ignorant, vicious and impetuous 
strikers.” Smith claimed that “but for the incitement of the Higher 
Wage organ, edited by one of the strike triumvirate, Giichi would 
doubtless be at work today instead of lying half-dead in the hospital.” 
Smith argued that the violence committed by the laborers could be 
directly attributed to the editorial content of the Nippu Jiji and the 
speeches made by the Higher Wage Association leaders. 
Another disturbance more than a week later in west O‘ahu seemed 
once more to confirm these allegations of criminality on the part of 
the strike movement leaders, who continued to publish “incendiary” 
material. Police arrested thirteen Japanese laborers and charged 
them with rioting at Waipahu on 8 June 1909.58 According to Eugene 
M. Scoville, an employee of the Oahu Sugar Company who was act-
ing as a special police officer that day, between “two and three hun-
dred” Japanese were following a laborer who had decided to return 
to work. They “rushed forward and jumped upon this Japanese . . .
and then started hitting him over the head with their hands.”59 Along 
with “Officer Wills,” Scoville went to the assistance of the laborer who 
was being beaten by the angry mob. The two forced their way into 
the crowd of Japanese who “were hollering and making a great deal 
of noise,” and then the mob “attempted to rush us, closed in on us.” 
To gain control of the situation, Wills drew his revolver and fired a 
shot into the air. Scoville pulled his own gun out, and recalled that 
“they jumped back,” but one striker came forward and said to him, 
“‘I no afraid, shoot, shoot me, I no care, suppose I make [die]; plenty 
more Japanese stop.” According to newspaper accounts, “Japs” came 
at them “through holes and doors and alleyways.”60 Eventually the 
men were able to escape, but not before August Spillner and his son, 
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who had come to their assistance, were attacked by “about 200 or 
more . . . [Japanese who] chased us up the road and fired stones and 
sticks after us.”61 It took 34 regular police officers and deputies, “each 
armed with carbine and revolver,” to restore order in Waipahu.62 This 
incident was sensationalized in the press as an example of Japanese 
violence and disorder. During the trial of the suspected riot leaders, 
though, Scoville was forced to admit upon cross-examination by attor-
ney Joseph Lightfoot that no violence against whites occurred as “they 
didn’t club us . . . [or] lay their hands on me.”63 
During the rioting trial, prosecutors also charged two of the defen-
dants with alleged participation in a “bold” kidnapping in broad 
daylight of a returning laborer by the name of Tsunoda.64 Although 
Lightfoot tried to persuade the court to release his clients, known 
only as Fuehino and Kawakami, on writs of habeas corpus, he was 
ultimately unsuccessful. Lightfoot could not locate Judge William T. 
Robinson at either his home or at the office, had his appeals denied 
by Judge John T. De Bolt, and was unsuccessful in scheduling an audi-
ence with Uyeno, who “declined to see him or allow any representa-
tive of the consulate to talk about the matter with him.”65 The trial, 
which began on 25 June, eventually resulted in a guilty conviction for 
all thirteen defendants.66
Meanwhile, on 10 June 1909, two days after the riot, William 
Henry arrested editor Soga and reporters Yokichi Tasaka and Keitaro 
Kawa mura of the Nippu Jiji, along with Makino and Negoro, officers 
of the Higher Wage Association, on charges of conspiracy as danger-
ous persons. Police officers also arrested Matsutaro Yamashiro, trea-
surer of the Association, and three more Nippu Jiji men. According 
to the indictment that was filed 12 June 1909, the accused had “com-
mitted the offence of being dangerous and disorderly persons.”67 
 Prosecutors claimed that the accused had full knowledge that “a large 
number of the Japanese residents of the Territory of Hawaii, more 
than One Thousand in number, were in an excited, turbulent, law-
less and unruly condition and state of mind, and threatening to do 
injury to the person and property of their respective employers and 
others.”68 In the indictment, prosecutors included translations of vari-
ous articles and publications of the Nippu Jiji and Higher Wage Asso-
ciation that threatened violence and death to those who challenged 
their cause: 
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Listen, Shimpo . . . you are the enemy of the Japanese . . . We will 
not forget forever the odious means employed by you in regard to the 
higher wage question . . . If you retire and quit being a publicist and 
take some other job, well and good . . . but as long as you are publishing 
a newspaper, which is an important thing, we, the laborers, will see that 
you are exterminated by secret or open means.69
According to the translations provided by prosecutors, the Nippu 
Jiji asserted that editor Shiba of the Hawaii Shinpo and his faction 
“care nothing for the laborers in general” and should be “prepared 
to die an honorable death.”70 These translations served as the cor-
nerstone of the prosecution’s case and prosecutors presented them 
as tangible proof of the violent tendencies of the accused. However, 
these translations were very controversial as the words and phrases 
cited by the prosecution were open to alternative translations with 
less radical connotations. According to scholar James Okahata, “many 
instances of forced literal translations of words and phrases, the equiv-
alent of which were practically non-existent in the English language 
occurred which were of disadvantage to the defendants.” Okahata 
cited the example of the phrase, “tettsui wo kudasu,” translated verba-
tim as “wielding an iron-hammer.”71 However, according to Okahata, 
“a more apt translation would have been ‘take decisive action.’” He 
noted that “words and phrases which had been ‘manufactured’ in the 
press war were also mutilated or misrepresented to the disadvantage 
of the defendants.” Okahata added that the official court interpreter 
translated “Okintama-men” as “sycophant” or “secret force,” whereas 
a more accurate interpretation would have been “toadying” or “trai-
tors to the cause.”72 A struggle over the meaning of Japanese words 
ensued and had considerable implications since each side fought to 
ascribe guilt or innocence based upon the intricacies and nuances of 
the Japanese language. 
Within the strike itself, language became a contested terrain in 
the Japanese- and English-language presses as both sides sought to 
represent the “voice” of the large Japanese population and publicize 
the true nature of the strike and the intentions of the Higher Wage 
Association. While Yasutaro Soga portrayed the organization and 
the strike as “proper” and “reasonable,” editor Smith of the Pacific 
Commercial Advertiser, alleged that the Higher Wage Association was 
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nothing more than a “private money-making hui [group]” which has 
“misled” and “deluded” the average striking worker who is “simply 
an ignorant peasant.”73 The nuances of the Japanese language, in 
particular the multiple meanings for each word or phrase depend-
ing on the context or the author’s intent, led to constant conflicts in 
the papers. Governor Walter F. Frear personally conceded that “many 
Japanese words have double meanings and the radicals claimed that 
their newspaper articles were intended in a proper sense.”74 Within 
the Japanese community, the translations given by the conservative 
newspapers sparked heated debates and highlighted the lack of con-
sensus among the Japanese.
After the men each posted a $1,200 bond, the authorities released 
the strike leaders the following day. However, on 14 June, police offi-
cers again arrested them on the charge of obstructing the operation 
of the sugar plantations.75 The police also confiscated, without the 
benefit of a warrant, documents from the offices of the Nippu Jiji as 
well as from the residences and offices of strike leaders. According 
to Yasutaro Soga, while he was incarcerated at O‘ahu Prison, he was 
called out to the jail yard at midnight where William Henry and inter-
preter Chester A. Doyle waited. They escorted him to a waiting car-
riage that went to the Nippu Jiji offices on Hotel Street, breaking and 
entering into locked offices and safes while others searched the resi-
dences of the men.76
After seizing potentially incriminating documents, authorities 
began to build their case and rushed to prosecute the defendants, 
who now languished in jail. The trial against the strike leaders started 
on 26 July in the First Circuit Court, with Judge De Bolt presiding. 
Light foot, an Englishman who was a former high school mathemat-
ics teacher and whose strength lay in his “limitless combative spirit,” 
 represented the defendants since all of the other attorneys in Hono-
lulu were either closely associated with the HSPA or charged prohibi-
tively exorbitant fees.77 On the opposing bench was attorney William 
Ansel Kinney of the law partnership of Kinney and Balthau, which the 
press described as “among the first in Hawaii legal circles of that day.”78 
Although Kinney was a private attorney who had been retained by 
both the HSPA and Sometaro Shiba, the territorial attorney general’s 
office had appointed him deputy attorney general representing the 
Territory in the strike case.79 Kinney himself testified that he believed 
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that the Nippu Jiji had “gone to astonishing lengths in openly and 
continuously threatening personal violence, not only against Sheba, 
but any Japanese who stood out against, or in any way thwarted, the 
impending strike.”80 Kinney asserted that “agitation” had even spread 
to the highest Japanese business circles in the city of Honolulu as “the 
Yokohama Specie Bank was in it, as well as the Japanese wholesale 
houses,” a radical claim that has never been proven.81 Assisting Kin-
ney were Mason Fay Prosser and Robbins B. Anderson, young lawyers 
from the same firm.82 According to Soga, “in court they presented an 
imposing spectacle.”83
“The Strike Agitation Case Trial”84
The trial lasted from 21 July to 18 August, with attorneys on both sides 
presenting numerous exhibits to the jury and engaging in debates 
over the literal translation of the articles published in the Japanese 
newspapers that the prosecution had submitted as evidence.85 “As 
far as possible,” Soga attested, “the plaintiffs were inclined to force 
the inference of a strong, evil meaning. Each time the defendants 
objected and insisted upon a correction. And much time was con-
sumed in such things.”86 Professor Walter Denning, from Japan, who 
had a reputation of being “well-versed” in Japanese language and lit-
erature, translated the articles for the prosecution.87 However, alle-
gations of personal bias tainted the accuracy and credibility of his 
translations, as rumors spread through Honolulu that the HSPA had 
defrayed the cost of his passage to Hawai‘i from Japan and gave him 
an honorarium of $2,000.88 
The case against the defendants also revolved around their actions 
“in conducting an agitation and campaign for higher wages for Japa-
nese laborers,” which included publishing “certain, menacing, threat-
ening, exciting, inflammatory, insulting and abusive words, state-
ments and articles” supporting the strike, “calculated and designed to 
induce violence upon and an assault against . . . S. Shiba.”89 Through-
out the strike, as the exchange of accusations became more heated, 
many strikers had focused their animosity on Hawaii Shinpo editor 
Shiba. Thereafter, Shiba became increasingly concerned about the 
threat of violence to himself. He not only requested police protection 
but also applied for a $10,000 life insurance policy, which the planters 
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funded.90 He had translated the Nippu Jiji articles for the police and 
the authorities used his assertion that assassination plans existed in 
Soga’s safe at the Nippu Jiji office as a pretext for their illegal search 
and seizure. During the conspiracy trial, prosecutors charged the 
strike leaders with crimes against fellow Japanese, essentially protect-
ing the rights of some Japanese at the expense of others’ civil liberties. 
The trial effectively turned public attention away from the injustices 
and inequalities that existed on the plantations and focused instead 
on Japanese crimes against other Japanese. This selective understand-
ing of the strike and the resulting application of the law underscored 
the close relationship between police, judicial, and territorial authori-
ties and the planters; this approach also spoke to the planters’ acuity 
in exploiting the ethnic character of the strike by shifting Japanese 
and public attention away from strike issues and toward the issues of 
differences and conflicts within the Japanese community. 
Among the first on the stand in the conspiracy trial was Giichi, the 
Preparing Japanese sweets for the strikers, who had left plantations and lived in tem-
porary shelters provided for them in Kaka‘ako and Mō‘ili‘ili, Honolulu, Hawai‘i. 1909. 
Bishop Museum. 
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laborer who had been beaten for returning to his job. He testified 
about his assault, which prosecutors attributed to “higher wage pro-
paganda” that had begun long before the strike.91 Although defense 
attorney Lightfoot tried to discredit Giichi’s testimony, a brutal attack 
a few days later against Shiba, the leading Japanese opponent of the 
strike, seemed to confirm the accuracy of Giichi’s statements to the 
jury. 
On 3 August, Tomekichi Mori, one of Makino’s former employ-
ees and a member of the Higher Wage Association, brutally attacked 
and stabbed editor Shiba in the neck with a pocketknife. As Shiba 
struggled with Mori, eventually pinning him to the ground, Elisha 
J. McCandless, a sign painter who was working nearby, came to Shi-
ba’s assistance. Police took both Shiba and Mori to the police station. 
Later, officers drove Shiba in a patrol wagon to The Queen’s Hospital, 
where he lost consciousness due to the loss of blood from his wounds. 
After his arrest, Mori allegedly stated, “I punished Sheba because he 
is a traitor to the Japanese people . . . I’m glad I did it . . . and I’m only 
sorry I didn’t do a better job of it. I have punished Sheba, and now 
I’m ready to pay for it.”92 News of the attack quickly spread, and the 
conspiracy trial was adjourned for the day on account of this violent 
attack, which occurred just as Negoro was testifying about his “mild 
and peaceable” strike methods and his admonitions against the use of 
violence to striking Aiea laborers.93 
The attack made front-page headlines in most of the major news-
papers in Honolulu, and the Pacific Commercial Advertiser portrayed the 
attack as an example of “what the Nippu Jiji has been preaching for 
months—that Sheba is a traitor to, and an enemy of, his own race and 
should be punished, exterminated, put out of the way.”94 Although 
Mori was unquestionably guilty of attacking Shiba, it was uncertain if 
Mori had acted on his own accord or if he had been inspired by senti-
ments expressed by the strike leaders. The Pacific Commercial Adver-
tiser asserted that Mori “had been taught by Soga and Makino and 
Negoro and the other leaders of the Japanese strike that Sheba was 
a detriment to the ultimate success of the strike, a man whom the 
Japanese would be much better off without.”95 The assault on Shiba 
seemed clearly to demonstrate the culpability of the strike leaders 
regarding the violence associated with the strike as well as the appli-
cability of the conspiracy charges against them. Ultimately, a jury took 
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just six hours to find the defendants, Makino, Negoro, Soga, Tasaka, 
Kawamura, Mitsunaga, Shigeta, and Hamada guilty of conspiracy in 
the third degree, despite an impassioned five-hour address by attor-
ney Lightfoot on behalf of the Higher Wage leaders. On 22 August, 
the court sentenced the men to ten months in prison and a fine of 
$300 dollars. In the appeals filed by Lightfoot with the District Court 
and Supreme Court of Hawai‘i, the justices sustained the original ver-
dict on 20 March in the following year, and the defendants entered 
the O‘ahu Prison in Iwilei to serve their sentences.96 
As he walked into a building that was “extremely antiquated” and 
“old, dirty and unsanitary,” Soga remembered being assailed by an 
“indescribable feeling of loneliness.”97 Each prisoner was placed in 
solitary confinement and had only a bucket to use as a chamber pot. 
Originally, these prisoners could not leave their cells except to receive 
three daily meals. They could only read at night “standing beside the 
door-window” to catch the light from the jail corridor. Officials even-
tually relaxed restrictions and the men undertook various jobs in the 
jail, such as polishing brass, weeding the prison garden, and clean-
ing the office of the head jailer. Prison fare mainly consisted of “poi, 
salmon, beef and pork,” but, as Soga noted, “from the day we entered 
jail until the day we left, the prefectural assistance societies, together 
with other sympathizers, brought us three meals a day.”98 The por-
tions were so generous that the strike leaders shared the food with 
other prisoners. Despite often bitter differences of opinion within 
the Japanese community during the strike, a substantial number of 
Japanese supported the strike leaders’ actions. Supporters demon-
strated their continued allegiance to the cause by supplying meals to 
the prisoners, ensuring that the men remained well nourished even 
while behind bars. Soga reported that frequent “stomach aliments” 
weakened Tasaka and Negoro as they served their time, but he and 
Makino enjoyed “good health.”99 However, Soga faced his own pro-
fessional and personal problems as he was forced to watch helplessly 
as the remaining staff of the Nippu Jiji fought off a number of hostile 
takeover attempts while he was incarcerated. One suspected buyer 
was allegedly Shiba, who sought to monopolize the Japanese press in 
Hawai‘i with the support of the planters. Only the efforts of “Manager 
Kawamoto” and other officers and sympathizers rescued the company 
from this “critical situation.”100
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Soga’s work on behalf of the Higher Wage Association came at 
great expense to his family, as he was forced to leave his sick wife 
and their two young children upon his sentencing. “The thing that 
saddened me the most,” Soga reported, “was my sick wife and two 
children,” who were left alone without any means of support.101 
Through the “kindness of many friends,” his wife’s health continued 
to improve but her doctors recommended that she return to Japan 
to seek additional treatment. Accompanied by the deputy head jailer, 
Soga was allowed to see his wife and children as they boarded a ship in 
Honolulu Harbor bound for Japan. Only at this time did he recognize 
the “extreme seriousness” of his wife’s illness. As his wife departed, he 
resigned himself to “never meeting her alive,” a premonition fulfilled 
soon after when he received word of his wife’s death. 
This sad news reached Soga just as he was notified that Acting Gov-
ernor E. A. Mott-Smith had signed a special pardon on 4 July 1910, 
commuting the sentences of the strike leaders to time served. This 
surprising development resulted from the combined efforts of both 
Japanese and white community leaders, who secured the endorse-
ment of J. B. Cooke, president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Asso-
ciation.102 It is difficult to determine the reason behind Cooke’s unex-
pected support for reducing the prison sentences of the strike leaders. 
Soga reported that Cooke had asserted “he did not desire to further 
oppress the four leaders of the wage increase issue, who had simply 
fought for their principles.”103 In addition, nearly a year had passed 
since the strike had been called off in a meeting on 5 August 1909, 
attended by representatives from all the islands. This more concilia-
tory stance echoed in some of the concessions the planters had made 
to the workers at that time, such as an improvement in living condi-
tions, the establishment of a merit pay system, an increase in contract 
payments to cane growers, and the institution of a turnout bonus sys-
tem whereby laborers were obligated to work a certain number of 
days before they were eligible for a bonus. According to Negoro’s esti-
mates, these benefits totaled at least $500,000 in payments to contract 
cane growers and $20,000 in bonuses to ordinary laborers.104 In 1912, 
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association also announced an increase 
of $2 in the basic pay of ordinary laborers, raising minimum wages to 
$20 per month, in addition to what could be earned in a bonus system 
based on the market price of sugar.
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The Aftermath of the Strike and Its “Indisputable Truth”105
The impact of the 1909 strike continued to reverberate in the years 
after the conspiracy trial and the release of the strike leaders. The 
attempted murder of Shiba for his collusion with planter interests dur-
ing this labor conflict came to represent the violent tendencies and 
disorderly conduct of those in the Japanese population who intended 
to overthrow the existing political, social, and economic hierarchy. 
Nearly a decade later, officials raised concerns about another Japa-
nese “conspiracy” to seize control of the Hawaiian Islands in the 1920 
strike, which involved Japanese and Filipino laborers in the first inter-
ethnic labor movement.106 White political and economic leaders used 
these strikes as a means of disenfranchising Japanese leaders, who 
were denied due process and equal treatment under the law, thereby 
weakening the ethnic and labor leadership. Allegations of Japanese 
criminality likewise continued to circulate in the white community 
as a means of discrediting Japanese claims of economic and politi-
cal discrimination. Planters and territorial officials couched Japanese 
activism in terms of national allegiance and associated the strike as 
part of a strategy by the Japanese emperor to seize control of the sugar 
industry and Hawai‘i. Prosecutor Kinney expressed his personal belief 
that this strike and the ensuing labor agitation by Japanese workers 
were parts of a larger plot by the Japanese to control agricultural pro-
duction in Hawai‘i, similar to what had occurred in California, where 
“large communities of Japanese in certain of the valleys of California 
have control and possession and virtually own very large areas of land 
once occupied and worked by white labor.”107 According to Kinney, 
“in our investigation, however, before even the strike was declared 
we . . . reali[z]ed that the strike was secondarily an economic one.” 
Kinney charged that “the real motive and purpose in back of the 
movement was racial and political . . . to confiscate the bulk of the 
wealth and earning power of these plantation properties” so that, 
“if not actually owned by the Japanese,” the plantations would have 
been “virtually so.”108 Some individuals who feared that Hawai‘i would 
become a “Japanese colony” supported the immediate eviction of the 
Japanese.”109 Collectively, these events tapped into existing anti-Asian 
sentiment and national fears of the “yellow peril” that seemed to be 
realized in the labor conflicts of the early twentieth century.110 
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Such charges and threats against the Japanese illuminated the fear-
driven and shared interests of select white business and political lead-
ers who attempted to control the Japanese first through the planta-
tion labor system and secondly through the legal system. As defense 
attorney Lightfoot emphasized in his final address to the jury, the 
prosecution’s case was essentially carried out by the HSPA’s lawyers, 
resulting in the judicial branch of the government operating at the 
behest of private interests. Subsequently, it became difficult to deter-
mine if prosecutors were acting on behalf of “the Territory of Hawaii 
or the Planters’ Association.”111 In his closing statements, Lightfoot 
asserted that “these men are being persecuted” not because of an 
actual conspiracy, but because of “having engineered a strike.”
Collusion also occurred between Japanese consular officials and 
the planters, as well as among select editors of the Japanese and 
English-language presses, to discredit Japanese labor protests and 
to ensure a stable workforce. The planters not only controlled the 
largest white-owned newspapers in the Territory—the Honolulu Star-
Bulletin and the Honolulu Advertiser—but also influenced many of the 
“conservative” Japanese papers that condemned the strike, such as 
the Hawaii Shinpo and Hawaii Nichi Nichi Shinbun. According to Yoshi-
goro Kimura of the Nichi Nichi, the editors of both the Shinpo and 
Nichi Nichi had received $100 monthly from the HSPA. Beginning in 
April 1909, a month prior to the strike, they took in “a considerable 
amount in addition to the $100,” totaling in some instances $2,000.112 
While the 1909 strike was the largest labor movement at that time 
involving Japanese, not all Japanese agreed with the aims of the strike 
and some sacrificed community interests and ethnic solidarity for 
their own personal gain. The planters skillfully exploited differences 
within the Japanese community while emphasizing the ethnic char-
acter of the strike to weaken support among the Chinese, Korean, 
Portuguese, and Hawaiian populations in Hawai‘i. The planters suc-
cessfully employed the strategy of “divide and rule” to alienate the 
Japanese from other ethnic workers and to weaken the Japanese com-
munity from within by pitting Japanese against Japanese and charg-
ing the strike leaders with crimes against fellow workers.113 The HSPA 
also distanced the strikers from larger community support and hired 
strikebreakers from different racial groups to break the morale and 
the ethnic solidarity of the Japanese. 
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Although the white oligarchy that controlled Hawai‘i proved gen-
erally hostile to labor movements, not all whites agreed with the tac-
tics adopted by the HSPA or were cowed by the planters’ extensive 
political, social, and economic influence. Both whites and Japanese 
stayed active in the movement to commute the sentences of the strike 
leaders once they were incarcerated at O‘ahu Prison. One of the most 
significant supporters of the strike leaders was Lightfoot, who had 
worked tirelessly on behalf of the Japanese defendants in both the riot 
and the conspiracy cases. Neither were all Japanese innocent, as some 
committed criminal acts, such as Tomokichi Mori, who freely admit-
tedly that he had attacked Shiba. Others engaged in illegal activity as 
labor spies and accepted bribes from the planters to print favorable 
newspaper accounts of the planters while condemning the Higher 
Wage Association and its leaders. Thus, designations of criminal activ-
ity and justice remained highly fluid as these “dangerous” Japanese 
images could be used to empower the planters as well as criminal-
ize and marginalize Japanese. Many of these crimes lacked simple 
designations of victim or perpetrator and were often committed to 
correct perceived community injustices as well as to address personal 
grievances. Often these crimes left open the possibility of some justice 
for the Japanese and some propriety on the part of white authorities 
regarding Japanese crimes and subversion. 
The extent to which both sides attempted to arouse favorable 
public sentiment and support—in other words, the extent to which 
both sides worked to control the narrative of Japanese intentions in 
Hawai‘i—suggested the significance of the strike in Hawaiian history 
and its repercussions for both America and Japan. While the 1909 
strike originated from worker complaints over low pay and poor hous-
ing conditions, it inevitably reflected more than just economic issues, 
as it represented a challenge to the political and social system of 
Hawai‘i supported by the plantations. It also eventually involved the 
Japanese and American governments, which closely monitored the 
situation due to their mutual desire for a stable and compliant Japa-
nese labor force, which had been the intent behind the 1907 Gentle-
man’s Agreement Act ending Japanese migration to Hawai‘i and the 
United States. 
The 1909 strike offered planters the opportunity to develop strate-
gies to suppress future labor movements, such as employing strike-
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breakers, further applying the tactic of “divide and rule,” alleging 
Japanese criminality, and convicting Japanese leaders within a legal 
system biased against ethnic minorities. Although the planters suc-
ceeded in breaking the strike, the brief unrest of this period sparked 
change in the industry. According to Beechert, “workers had demon-
strated an ability they were deemed not to possess” as they challenged 
racial, economic, and legal discrimination, often at great personal 
sacrifice.114 Most striking workers struggled to support their families 
while calling for reforms of the industries, and some found it difficult 
to find later employment due to their participation in the strike.115 At 
the same time, the leaders of the movement faced constant harass-
ment by police and had to fight being charged with various crimes. 
Their participation in the strike often came at great financial and per-
sonal sacrifice. Soga, for example, arguably suffered some of the worst 
violations of his civil rights and endured some of the greatest personal 
losses as he was unable to be at his wife’s side during her dying days or 
to care for their two children. 
The efforts of the planters to control the ethnic press ultimately 
resulted in a lack of credibility for the “conservative” Japanese-lan-
guage newspapers, particularly the Hawaii Shimpo that the Advertiser 
highlighted in a full-page laudatory spread, entitled “Making of a 
Japa nese Paper” in 1910.116 After a former reporter of the Shimpo 
alleged that planters had bribed the paper in October 1912, Soga 
reported that “in the post offices of all the islands the unopened Nichi 
Nichi and Hawaii Shimpo were piled up like mountains” as “no one 
would touch them.”117 Eventually, editor Shiba of the Hawaii Shimpo 
returned to Japan in 1917. He died at the age of eighty at his country 
home in Ibara prefecture, infamously known for having “sold his sup-
port to the planters for cash.”118 
Japanese labor and political activism persisted in the decades lead-
ing up to World War II as the Japanese population demanded equal 
political and economic rights. The strike experience honed the orga-
nizational and leadership skills of select individuals within the Japa-
nese community and they remained active in various causes affecting 
the Japanese, including the Japanese-language school controversy, the 
fight for citizenship rights, continued labor disputes, and sensational 
Japanese criminal cases. Two men in particular, Soga and Makino, 
emerged as leading figures in the Japanese community and in the 
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Japanese-language presses as the respective editors of the Nippu Jiji 
and the Hawaii Hochi. They challenged the planters on issues related 
to the Japanese, such as the 1920 strike, and participated in debates 
with one another in the Japanese press. The Japanese-language news-
papers played a significant role in the community, often to the dis-
may of the planters, by offering an alternative point of view and a 
counter narrative of Japanese mayhem and violence so prominently 
trumpeted in the white-dominated press. Ironically, years later and on 
the occasion of his death, the Honolulu Advertiser chose to recognize 
Soga’s fifty-seven years of service and his role as the “patriarch” of 
Hawai‘i’s Japanese newspapers, elevating the reputation of a man it 
had once tried to destroy.119 
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